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The purpose of this paper is to develop an empirically verifiable 
framework for explaining patterns of third world defense expenditures. In 
doing so we have merged two areas of research that previously have been 
examined somewhat separately-economic (or ability to spend) with polit-
ical (willingness to allocate resources to defense). In general our findings 
indicate that military regimes appear committed to developing the size of 
the defense sector to levels not warranted by economic size per se. They 
have done this through extensive use of externally borrowed funds. They 
have used increases in foreign exchange earnings to expand defense 
allocations, and they have distorted their price systems in a manner that 
facilitates increased defense expenditures. The major finding of the study is 
that ability and willingness factors, rather than external conditions, are 
instrumental in affecting third world military expenditures. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades, there has been a keen interest and a growing 
literature concerning the economic conditions associated with military expendi-
tures in developing countries (Deger, 1986; Looney 1986c, 1988; Mullins, 1987; 
Deger and West, 1987; Chan, 1985, 1987). A key concern has been the effect of 
economic conditions in constraining the budgetary position of third world gov-
ernments. In tum, budgetary (and often foreign exchange) constraints delineate 
the tradeoffs between defense and socioeconomic expenditures that policy 
makers must confront (Looney, 1986b, 1987b; Looney and Frederiksen, 1986). 
Undertaken quite independently, another broad area of research has been 
concerned with the relative differences in defense allocations between third 
world military and civilian regimes. Do the patterns of defense expenditure vary 
significantly between military and civilian regimes, and if so, why? 
To date, the results obtained in both areas have often produced poor 
predictions of the level of defense expenditures in various third world countries. 
By omitting political factors, the economic approach, concentrating on the ability 
to finance increased defense expenditures, has failed to anticipate changes in the 
willingness to finance these expenditures brought on by regime change. By 
omitting economic constraints, the political approach has failed to anticipate 
alterations in defense expenditures brought on by changing economic condi-
tions. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a more general (and hopefully more 
accurate) picture of third world defense expenditures by integrating economic 
(ability) with political (willingness) considerations. 
REVIEW OF THE L1TERATURE 
Regimes identified as civilian or military have frequently been compared in 
order to examine the possible linkage between military influence over the 
decision making process for allocating resources and the level of budgetary 
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support acquired by the military. The central hypothesis of such efforts is that 
ceterius paribus military regimes will be more generous in supporting the military 
than will civilian regimes. Most of these efforts have acknowledged the great 
difficulties that exist in the measurement and meaning of data on military and 
nonmilitary budget expenditures. At the same time, most quantitative analyses 
(Grindle and West, 1986:1-2) of the linkage between regime type and budgetary 
decision-making have indicated that the relationship is an elusive one and that 
independent variables other than regime type probably hold more explanatory 
power in accounting for resource allocations for national defense and other 
public policy areas. 
Remmer (1978:41-42) has summarized this research by noting that: 
The empirical studies of regime type, public policy, and policy outcomes conducted so far, 
whether focused on Latin America or including other areas as well, tend to support the 
conclusion that regime differences have little or no impact on public policy. 
However, despite these disappointing empirical results, highly plausible 
arguments can still be advanced to support the proposition that third world 
military governments tend to pursue distinctive public policies, compared with 
those of their civilian counterparts. 
Johnson (1962) has pointed to the social class and professional backgrounds 
of officers and argued that concern for national defense and prestige, technical 
proficiency, and middle-class orientations create a tendency for the military 
actively to support economic development. Thus Johnson noted that in the more 
developed countries such as Argentina, where professionalism was advanced, 
the armed forces were in the forefront of those most concerned with the 
desirability of industrial growth. 
Clearly, the insulation of the military from the demands of particularistic 
interests that might compromise national development efforts may, of course, 
eventually result in intense pressures for the military to return authority to 
civilians during periods of deteriorating economic conditions (Richards, 1985). 
Along these lines Looney (1987c) concluded that the general orientation of 
many modern third world military regimes is ultraconservatism combined with 
military force to dismantle organizations of popular expression, to restrain real 
wages, to promote integration into world trade and financial markets, and to 
hold down social reform as well as mass consumption, in the interest of favoring 
capital accumulation and increased defense expenditures. 
As a general proposition, military regimes may be more inclined to align 
themselves with one of the superpowers and look to that source for the major 
bulk of financing for its arms imports. For example, in the case of military 
expenditures in Latin America, it is often argued that the influence of the United 
States on the doctrines and funding of the military is a central causal factor in 
rising military budgets (Grindle and West, 1986: 25). 
One implication of these factors is that military regimes may be able to 
obtain a significantly larger volume of external financing (presumably some of 
which would be used for weapons acquisition from a major superpower) than 
their civilian counterparts. 
As noted above, the analysis that follows blends these two major themes--
the role economic factors play in affecting military expenditures (the ability to 
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allocate funds for defense) and the policy priorities of military regimes (the 
willingness to allocate funds for defense). 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A major methodological problem in any study of this sort concerns the 
classification of countries as military or civilian. Various attempts have been taken 
to identify the military component in politics. Here, a logical approach is to 
classify countries on the basis of subjective estimates of the degree of military 
influence in the day"to-day decision making of the government (Fagen and 
Cornelius, 1970; Needler, 1980; Perlmutter, 1980; Ruhl, 1981). A government 
directly controlled by the armed forces is an extreme example of militarization of 
the political process. But even long-established democracies where civilian con-
trol of the military is a firm tradition are not immune from military influence. The 
basis of this influence is not hard to find: within the central government structure, 
the military bureaucracy has the largest personnel component and administers 
the largest share of the public budget-factors which clearly affect the military's 
political influence. 
For purposes of this study, countries are considered under military control if 
they meet one or more of the following criteria: key political leadership by 
military officers; existence of a state of martial law; extra-judicial authority exer-
cised by security forces; lack of central political control over large sections of the 
country where official and unofficial security forces rule; or control by foreign 
military organizations (Sivard, 1983: 11-12). 
The countries that fall into the military group1 (in the early 1980s) share 
some common features. Most have long records of military rule: the average in 
1982 was sixteen years out of the prior twenty three (Sivard, 1983: 12). 
Perhaps one reason previous studies concluded that civilian and military did 
not differ significantly with regard to their allocations to defense lies in the fact 
that both regime types show a striking similarity with regard to several of the 
standard indices used to compare the military burden:2 
1. In terms of the share of national resources allocated for military purposes, 
civilian regimes spent 5.4 percent of their gross national product on 
defense, compared to 5.2 percent for the military regimes. 
2. Civilian regimes allocated 15.6 percent of their central government's 
budget to defense, compared with 16.5 percent for military regimes. 
3. Civilian regimes had 7.3 soldiers per 1,000 population compared with 
6.2 percent for the military regimes. 
1. Fifty out of an original sample of ninety five developing countries were classified as military 
regimes. Due to lack of comparable data, a number of these countries were not included in the final 
regression analysis. Those countries included were: Nicaragua, Indonesia, Sudan, South Korea, 
Rwanda, Niger, El Salvador, Pakiston, Turkey, Paragua"' Brazil, Philippines, Thailand, Liberia, Chile, 
Uruguay, Uganda, Central African Republic, Ghana, Burma, Argentina, Peru, Syria, and North 
Yemen. Civilian regimes included in the regression analysis were: India, Cameroon, Costa Rica, 
Bolivia, Senegal, Tunisia, Morocco, Malawi, Republic, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, 
Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe, Kuwait, Kenya, Jordan, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. 
2. Figures are for 1981 and are from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(1986). 
24 Journal of Political and Military Sociology 
While the military regimes averaged a higher level of arms imports ($315 
million vs. $233 million), civilian regimes tended to have higher overall levels of 
military expenditures ($1,511 million, vs. $1,112 million) than their military 
counterparts. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Starting with the two groups of countries defined above, a number of 
economic variables were selected as independent variables affecting the dollar 
value of military expenditures3 
1. It is reasonable to assume that country size will have a direct relationship 
to military expenditures and the capacity to financially support a given 
level of military allocations. Here country size is depicted by the overall 
level of gross domestic product (GDPB). 
2. The ability to finance military expenditures will also affect their overall 
magnitude. Several recent studies (Looney, 1987a; Shubik and Bracken, 
1983; Brzoska, 1983) have documented the role external public borrow-
ing has played in financing military expenditures in the third world, and 
beginning in the mid-1970s, this variable appears to have expanded in 
line with the arms buildup in the third world. The public sector debt 
(PDB) was selected to depict this phenomenon. 
3. The influence of foreign exchange on military expenditures are depicted 
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4. Military expenditures are assumed to be related to the degree of price 
distortions existing in developing countries. 4 Clearly, price distortions 
such as an overvalued exchange rate cheapen arms imports thereby 
reducing the cost of foreign military acquisitions. Price distortions were 
depicted by the distortion in exchange rates (EX), and the overall distor-
tion index, (DI). s 
Following Sheahan (1980), one might expect the degree of price distortion 
to be considerably higher (relative to civilian regimes) in authoritarian states. This 
is not the case. Overall, the comparative index (with higher values indicating 
increased degrees of distortion) for military regimes is 2.07, somewhat higher 
than the 1. 94 for civilian regimes. In terms of the individual components of the 
distortion index, military regimes appear to resort to a relatively high level of 
distortion in all areas except wages. 
Interestingly enough, the manner in which military and civilian regimes 
distort prices varies considerably, with military regimes tending to resort primarily 
to distortions in the foreign exchange rate. 
As noted above, price distortions may tend to cheapen the costs of military 
allocations and thus, everything else being equal, increase them. However, they 
may also result in a number of inefficiencies which may reduce the overall 
expansion of the economy, ultimately limiting any possible arms buildup. In the 
regression equations, therefore, no a priori sign is attached to these variables. 
In sum, the from of the regression equation, together with the expected signs 
of the variables, was: 
ME=f(GDPB, PDB, MTEA, Distortions) 
+ + + ? 
The estimated equations:6 
Military Regimes: 
RESULTS 
1. ME= -2.30 GDPB+2.37 PDB+0.64 MTEA+0.26 EX 
( -5.40) (5.02) (4.02) (3.21) 
r2= 0.896; F = 21.52; Df = 14 
2. ME= -2.17 GDPB+2.49 PDB+0.57 MTEA+ 0.18 DI 
(-5.13) + (5.13) (3.57) (3.04) 
r2= 0.887; F = 20. 76; OF = 14 
4. Price distortions exist when prices of good and services, as well as capital and labor, do not 
correctly reflect their relative scarcity. This situation may occur as a result of monopolistic tendencies 
in the private sector or by government intervention. I~ is possible for government interventions, if 
properly designed, to correct distortions. In most instances, however, government-sometimes 
deliberately, sometimes inadvertently-introduces price distortions in pursuit of some social or 
economic objective. 
5. Data are from Agarwala (1983: 49) and are for the years 1970-80. 
6. Economic and debt variables were taken from World Bank ( 1984); Military expenditure data 
is from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ( 1987). 
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Civilian Regimes: 
l'. ME= 1.95 GDPB 
(11.57) 
-1.33 PDB+0.02 MTEA-0.17 EX 
(-8.63) (0.27) (-2.16) 
r2= 0.947; F = 45.84; Df = 14 
2'. ME= 1.94 GDPB -1.28 PDB-0.02 MTEA- 0.15 DI 
(11.73) (9.34) (-0.45) (-2.07) 
r2= 0.953; F = 44.72; Df = 14 
not only yielded highly significant results but perhaps more importantly identified 
a number of major differences in the manner in which resources are allocated to 
defense in military and civilian regimes. In general: 
1. Defense expenditures are not related to overall economic activity in 
military regimes (evidenced by the negative sign on GDPB, equations 1 
and 2). This result suggests that the priority given to defense expendi-
tures by military regimes (willingness) exceeds the economic capacity of 
their countries to support these expenditures. (ability). In civilian regimes 
there is a close association between military expenditures and gross 
domestic activity. 
2. Public external debt is highly significant in financing (directly or indirectly) 
military expenditures in military regimes whereas a highly significant 
pattern holds between external public sector indebtedness and military 
expenditures. 
3. Imports and exports were statistically significant in contributing to in-
creased military expenditures in the military regimes, but were not signifi-
cant in the case of the civilian regimes. 
4. Increases in price distortions were used to mobilize resources for military 
expenditures in the military regimes, but these same increases had a 
negative impact on the military budget in civilian regimes. 
The results also provide some insights as to why aggregate studies of third 
world economies have failed to find significant links between economic variables 
and military expenditures. Since the signs of the major economic variables 
affecting military expenditures are considerably different depending on whether 
a country has a civilian or military regime, aggregating all countries in a single 
regression tends to blur the impact of the individual economic variables. For 
example, regressions for the total sample of countries yielded: 
1". ME=0.36 GDPB-0.31 PDB+0.71 MTEA+0.09 EX 
(0. 99) ( - 0. 92) (3. 74) (0. 70) 
r2= 0.516; F = 6.92; Df =28 
2". ME=0.34 GDPB-0.37 PDB+0.64 MTEA+0.07 EX 
(0.90) ( -1.25) (2.84) (0.51) 
r2= 0.403; F = 5.86; Df = 28 
In summary, while to some these results may appear self-evident, their 
empirical existence has not been previously identified. Military regimes appear 
committed to developing the size of the defense sector to levels not warranted by 
economic size per se. They have done this through extensive use of externally 
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borrowed funds. They have utilized increases in foreign exchange earnings to 
expand defense allocations and they have distorted their price systems in a 
manner that facilitated increased defense expenditures. It is interesting to note 
that well over eighty-five percent of the fluctuations in both military and civilian 
regimes can be accounted for by a limited number of economic variables. This 
fact holds irrespective of perceived threats, geographical location, or pressures 
from arms suppliers-factors often used to explain the level of military expendi-
tures in the third world. Finally, the results are in conformity with the results 
obtained independently in several recent individual country case studies 
(Looney 1987c); Looney and Frederiksen 1987). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Marek Thee (1982) has discussed the determinants of rapid military buildups 
in developing countries. He distinguishes between external factors, such as 
imperial rivalries and ideological/religious conflict, and internal factors such as 
vested interests of the military, the ready use of force as an instrument of 
diplomacy, and the adoption of a national security doctrine on a strong military. 
He suggests that while globally (and this particularly true for the superpowers) 
internal factors are more important, armament in developing countries "tends to 
be animated by external factors" (Thee, 1982: 114). Paramount amongst these 
factors is the willingness of developed countries to supply weaponry, both for 
profit and as a means of relocating major power struggles to distant shores. The 
export of weapons, it may be noted, is now almost exclusively in government 
hands. 
As noted above, the ability to finance arms imports and thus expand overall 
military expenditures, may vary depending on whether or not a country is a 
military regime. However, the overwhelming importance of economic variables 
in explaining third world military expenditures and their marked differences by 
regime type suggest that internal rather than external factors dominate in affect-
ing differences between individual countries. This is supported by the marked 
differences in the role price distortions play in military and civilian defense 
allocations. 
We can only conclude from the above analysis, therefore, that internal 
(ability and willingness) factors, rather than external conditions are instrumental 
in affecting third world military expenditures. 
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